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Abstract
An increasing share of the economy is organized around financial capitalism,
where capital market actors actively manage their claims on wealth creation
and distribution to maximize shareholder value. Drawing on four case studies of
private equity buyouts, we challenge agency theory interpretations that they are
‘welfare neutral’ and show that an alternative source of shareholder value is
breach of trust and implicit contracts. We show why management and employ-
ment relations scholars need to investigate the mechanisms of financial capital-
ism to provide a more accurate analysis of the emergence of new forms of class
relations and to help us move beyond the limits of the varieties of capitalism
approach to comparative institutional analysis.
1. Introduction
New financial intermediaries pose a challenge to researchers concerned with
understanding the changing nature of work and employment relations in
modern capitalist economies. Private equity (PE) firms exemplify these new
capital market actors, which act as intermediaries by raising private pools of
capital from investors and allocating these funds to the acquisition of oper-
ating companies. PE firms actively assert and manage shareholder claims on
wealth creation and distribution in these companies. Whereas shareholders
under managerial capitalism made money through investments in productive
enterprises and the creation and extraction of value through the management
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of the labour process, financial capitalism utilizes a wide range of avenues for
extracting wealth— including financial restructuring, the selling of assets and
tax arbitrage (Kaplan and Strömberg 2009: 123–5,134–5).
The field of management and employment relations needs to conceptualize
how new regimes of accumulation and value extraction operate under finan-
cial capitalism. Prior studies in comparative political economy and industrial
relations have shown how globalization has altered labour and product
market institutions, and in turn, the character of management and employ-
ment relations (Hancke et al. 2007; Katz and Darbishire 2000; Streeck and
Thelen 2005). However, most draw on a concept of the corporation as it
operated under managerial capitalism. New research needs to focus more
attention on how the activities of financial actors influence management
strategies and processes and the outcomes for a range of stakeholders. In
particular, research should examine how and why organizations depend on
implicit contracts and norms of reciprocity and trust to be productive and
how this approach challenges the conventional agency theory view that
intermediaries such as PE create positive ‘welfare-neutral’ gains for all stake-
holders. Agency theory argues that PE reduces managerial opportunism and
improves operational efficiency (Jensen 1993) by using high levels of leverage
(debt and securitization of assets), share ownership by managers, and moni-
toring by investors to subject managers to the discipline of the market. While
these efficiencies may provide one source of shareholder value, in this article,
we draw on institutional theories of implicit contracts to show how investors
may also increase their returns by breaching trust and reneging on implicit
contracts with other stakeholders. The logic of our argument is that stable
enterprises depend on employment and other contracts that cannot be com-
pletely specified because all contingencies cannot be covered. Hence, they
rely on implicit contracts; and to deter opportunistic behaviour, they build
institutional norms of reciprocity and trust between shareholders and
stakeholders (Schleifer and Summers 1988: 34). PE owners eager to realize
quick returns, however, may knowingly repudiate these implicit contracts
and achieve personal gain from the default on stakeholder claims (Thompson
2003: 366–8). From their perspective, the firm represents a disposable bundle
of assets that should be rearranged to improve shareholder value irrespective
of the outcomes for individual plants, firms, suppliers, workers or local
economies (Blackburn 2006: 42). If this opportunistic behaviour undermines
the implicit, trust-based relations on which the enterprise depends for its
long-term survival — and stakeholders, their livelihoods — it is not value
creating but value redistributing, and hence, not ‘welfare neutral’ (Schleifer
and Summers 1988: 42–44).
This institutional approach to analysing PE outcomes is one contribution
of this article. In addition, this approach suggests a way forward for employ-
ment relations scholars to expand their analysis of capital–labour relations
to include financial capitalist relations as well. The four cases we present
provide examples of how institutional labour research can contribute to a
more fine-grained theory of value extraction by moving beyond the labour
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process and an exclusive focus on labour–management relations to reveal the
variety of sources of value extraction under new forms of capitalist gover-
nance. In addition, this assessment of the more diverse mechanisms of value
extraction will also necessitate an analysis of how these mechanisms affect a
much broader array of stakeholders, including employees, suppliers and their
workers, workers as consumers and homeowners, communities and local
economies.
A third contribution of the article is to link this analysis of financial
mechanisms of value extraction to the broader debates found in the com-
parative institutional literature and the varieties of capitalism (VoC) thesis in
particular. The comparative statics of the VoC thesis present the state as a
discriminator between different market economies in terms of a search for
comparative institutional advantage and differentiated institutional reaction
to exogenous shocks. However, it is ill-equipped to explain the ascendency of
neoliberalism, financial capitalism and the recent financial crisis (Heyes et al.
2012). The VoC thesis reduces neoliberalism to a political technology for the
state to manage the economy across different types of business systems. We
draw on Heyes et al.’s (2012) critique of the VoC approach both theoretically
and empirically and suggest that the rise of neoliberalism as a political
technology has delivered a decisive shift in favour of the capitalist class. This
is evident in the extent to which finance represents a new growth regime for
business systems across different national environments — either by replac-
ing manufacturing as the dominant source of profitability or by replacing
productivity and innovation with financial engineering as the source of
profits in productive enterprises (Krippner 2011). We take these arguments
further in showing how the organization of work and labour relations is itself
a limited frame, as value extraction occurs through a variety of mechanisms
inside and outside of companies.
2. Agency theory, PE and breach of trust
In the framework of managerial capitalism career managers ran firms and
built industry-specific knowledge to manage the problems and possibilities
of alternative investments, which secured innovation and competitiveness.
Reliant primarily on salaries designed to reward managers as they climb the
organizational hierarchy, the long-run returns to top managers depended on
the success of the organization as a whole, which in turn depended on
controlling retained earnings and pursuing innovative investment strategies
(Lazonick 1992; O’Sullivan 2000). If firms are conceived of as a nexus of
contracts, then long-term employment and supplier contracts cannot be com-
pletely written to include all contingencies, and hence the parties must rely on
implicit interpretations based on trust and reciprocity to avoid opportunistic
behaviour. In this context, firms have promoted trustworthy managers who
are ‘loyalty filters’, committed to upholding implicit contracts to stakehold-
ers, which they understand are prior to shareholder claims (Schleifer and
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Summers 1988: 34–40). Thus, corporate managers have used the free cash
flow generated by company operations to induce a diverse group of stake-
holders to contribute to the enterprise. For example, they have provided
training and development in internal labour markets and contributed to local
communities to enhance the company’s or their personal reputations. In
unionized companies, they have negotiated productivity partnerships in
which workers receive a pay premium in exchange for increased effort.
Agency Theory
Whatever the managers’ motives and whatever the effects on hard-to-
measure future improvements in the firm’s competitive position, finance
economists argue that in the short term, these types of managerial decisions
do not maximize value for the company’s current shareholders. Rather, the
separation of ownership and control in large corporations is a fertile condi-
tion for the emergence of the principal-agent problem. Where shareholding is
dispersed, shareholders cannot effectively monitor managers’ behaviour or
exercise control over corporate decisions. Managerial strategies to enhance
performance via trust building are viewed as reducing profits that sharehold-
ers otherwise would receive.
According to agency theory, managers — especially those in mature firms
in low-growth industries — should return free cash flow to investors and
shareholders via share buy-backs and dividends and use debt to finance new
investment, subjecting these decisions to a market test (Jensen and Meckling
1976). The theory was put into practice in the leveraged buyout boom of the
1980s. The boom ended in scandal and financial distress for many prominent
highly leveraged firms, but agency theory continued to influence firm behav-
iour. Today, public companies regularly use free cash flow to buy back shares
and distribute profits to shareholders (Lazonick 2009). PE firms continue to
use high leverage to extract shareholder value on the grounds that this will
lead to a more efficient allocation of capital, will limit discretionary manage-
ment strategies, and will increase company earnings and shareholder returns.
The PE Business
PE firms are financial intermediaries that raise capital from pension funds,
mutual funds, sovereign wealth funds, endowments and wealthy individuals
— known as the limited partners of the fund. PE managers serve as the
general partners and use the limited partners’ investment to acquire a port-
folio of operating companies. The portfolio companies are acquired with the
expectation that the fund will make a profitable exit from the investment in
a few years. The general partner makes the decisions about which companies
to buy, how they should be managed and when they should be sold. The
limited partners share in any gains (or losses) but do not have a say in any
strategic decisions or who sits on the company board.
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The PE firm typically sponsors multiple special purpose PE investment
funds. Each fund is structured as a separate entity and each deal is structured
as a separate corporation. Deals made by one of these funds do not affect
either the sponsoring firm or its other funds. If a portfolio company of one
fund experiences distress or enters bankruptcy or administration, the equity
partners in the fund will lose their stakes in this firm and creditors can seize
the property or business, but the PE firm that sponsored the PE investment
is not liable for the firm’s losses.
Firms that sponsor PE funds operate on a ‘2 and 20’ model. They typically
collect a flat 2 per cent management fee on all funds committed to the
investment fund by the limited partners, whether or not the funds have been
invested. Limited partners hold funds that have been committed but not yet
invested in low-yielding liquid assets so that they are available when the PE
firm calls on them. The firm that sponsors the fund — the general partner in
the fund — also receives 20 per cent of all investment profits once a hurdle
rate of return has been achieved. As a result of these fees and of the necessity
to hold committed funds in liquid assets, returns to the limited partners are
generally lower than the advertised returns to the fund. Profits realized by the
general partners are referred to as carried interest and taxed in the USA and
the UK at the lower capital gains rate, currently 28 per cent in the UK and 15
per cent in the USA, not at the top personal income rate of 40 per cent in the
UK and 35 per cent in the USA.
PE funds buy businesses the way individuals purchase houses — with a
down payment supported by mortgage finance. PE, however, borrows the
major part of the purchase price from investment banks, hedge funds or other
large lenders — who earn interest and then quickly package the loans into
commercial mortgage-backed securities and resell them. In addition, while
homeowners pay their own mortgages, PE funds make their portfolio firms
responsible for the loans. PE firms argue that the debt can be paid down out
of the higher earnings of the portfolio company that result when the
principal-agent problem is solved and greater efficiency is achieved.
In sum, PE firms are financial intermediaries, which Strine (2011) has
argued represent a ‘separation of ownership from ownership control’ analo-
gous to that identified by Berle and Means. In the current form, these inter-
mediaries who act on behalf of their own investors have powerful financial
incentives (2 and 20 model) to push boards in portfolio firms into risky
activities that may be adverse to the long-term interests of the firm. By
de-listing firms from publicly traded stock exchanges, PE firms are uncon-
strained by contractual or moral duties to non-investor stakeholders in a
portfolio company, which may facilitate behaviours such as breach of trust
or disregard for implicit contracts.
Breach of Trust and Implicit Contracts
In their analysis of the sources of increased returns following a hostile buyout
of a firm, Schleifer and Summers (1988) distinguish between value-creating
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and value-redistributing effects of such takeovers. While not denying that
such takeovers can improve efficiency and create value, they argue that the
new owners have incentives to increase their own returns by redistributing
wealth from other stakeholders to themselves. PE takeovers are leveraged
buyouts that provide similar incentives for opportunistic behaviour by new
owners. As Metrick and Yasuda (2010: 5) observe, the overriding goal of a
PE fund is to maximize financial returns to the fund’s partners within a
relatively short time frame. For this reason, they may be willing to default on
implicit contracts even though these have been a major source of the value
created in the acquired firm. Value creation, for example, depends on
workers’ and suppliers’ willingness to exert extra discretionary effort, share
risks or invest in relation-specific capital in exchange for long-term contracts
in which they collect rewards over time. Implicit contracts are the most
cost-effective way to ensure that stakeholders work productively when con-
tracts cannot be written to cover all contingencies (Schleifer and Summers
1988: 37–38).
Whether the top managers in the portfolio company are complicit in
breaching implicit contracts is an empirical question. Schleifer and Summers
assume that existing managers will remain loyal and must be replaced by the
new owners. In PE buyouts, however, top managers often receive pay-for-
performance incentives that convince them to implement the strategies that
break contractual agreements. The question of managerial complicity with
breach of trust, therefore, depends on the conditions of the leveraged buyout.
This argument challenges the agency theory view that PE shareholder
returns are due to wealth creation and that they are welfare neutral. The new
owners gain at the expense of employees and suppliers who lose the returns
on their human capital investments. In addition, this transfer of wealth can
result in efficiency losses that reduce overall shareholder gains because once
the new owners have broken trust, they may lose their future ability to create
new value via efficient contracting with stakeholders.
3. Four cases: contractual cancellation and breach of trust
To illustrate our arguments, we draw on four radically different cases: The
US department store chain, Mervyn’s, where vendors, workers, creditors and
the firm suffered losses at the expense of PE owners; the British-owned EMI
Music Corporation, where creative artists, managers, creditors and the firm
were economically undermined; the rent-controlled Manhattan apartment
complexes Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper Village, where renters and credi-
tors lost millions; and British confectioner, Cadbury’s, where traditional
industrial communities face massive job loss through plant closures. This
four-case research design is useful for theory building because it shows the
generalizability of similar mechanisms of value extraction across radically
different industries, occupations and national contexts. These cases are not
typical of an emergent form of capitalism in a statistical sense, but they are
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representative of the processes and outcomes of acquisition activity based on
the short-term goals of new financial actors dominated by the constraints of
financial capitalism. The cases demonstrate the use of breach of contracts
in the context of other strategies and how this process plays out for very
different groups of stakeholders — low-wage service workers, managers,
vendors, creditors, the ‘creative class’, workers as renters and consumers, and
traditional manufacturing communities.
Mervyn’s
Mervyn’s department store chain — a major US mid-tier retailer that in 2004
had 30,000 employees and 257 stores, including 155 that were owned by the
company — was a good candidate for a PE buyout. The chain, while prof-
itable, had suffered from neglect by corporate management since its acquisi-
tion years earlier by the Target Corporation. Target’s share price rose on
news of the divestiture (Earnest 2004), and Mervyn’s employees were prom-
ised that the new PE owners would spruce up the stores, bring in new
management to strengthen operations and business strategy, and improve the
chain’s performance in an increasingly competitive market (Misonzhnik
2009; Tamaki 2004; Thornton 2008).
The leveraged buyout of Mervyn’s by a consortium of PE firms in Sep-
tember 2004 for $1.2 billion (Misonzhnik 2009) followed a common pattern
in retail. The PE consortium (comprising Cerberus Capital Management,
Sun Capital Partners, and Lubert-Adler and Klaff Partners) immediately
split Mervyn’s into an operating company (Mervyn’s Holdings LLC) and a
property company controlled by the investors (MDS Realty), who owned the
firm’s valuable real estate assets. Mervyn’s received little or no financial
benefit from this transaction. The PE partners put in $400 million in equity
and funded the balance of the buyout by using Mervyn’s real estate as
collateral to borrow $800 million through Bank of America. The loan pro-
ceeds were paid to Target, with Mervyn’s receiving no compensation and no
residual interest in the property. The bank quickly securitized the loan —
bundled it with other loans — and resold it. MDS Realty then leased the real
estate back to Mervyn’s stores at high rents in order to service the debt and
to extract value over time (Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP 2010). A
year later, having held the properties long enough to obtain capital gains tax
treatment, MDS Realty sold the stores, most of them to two large real estate
investment trusts — Developers Diversified Realty Corporation and Inland
Western Retail Real Estate Trust (Levenfeld Pearlstein 2011). None of the
proceeds went toMervyn’s, which had been required by its PE owners to sign
individual 20-year leases for each store at high rents that were scheduled to
rise further each year.
While failing to keep pace with its main competitors, Mervyn’s neverthe-
less had net operating income of $160 million in 2003, its last full year of
operation under Target. The PE investors made modest improvements by
broadening product selection, closing stores in unprofitable regions, and
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focusing on the West and Southwest where the chain was strongest. The
president, CEO, CFO, finance VP, CIO and supply chain manager — all of
the C group according to a former Mervyn’s VP — were replaced (corporate
VP interview, 10 June 2011). Nevertheless, the chain’s new executives had
difficulty making the chain competitive — due in part to the high rents the
stores were now required to pay and the payment of dividends to PE owners
from the stores’ cash flow in 2005 and 2006 (Thornton 2008). Sceptical of the
PE owners’ commitment to the company, four CEOs entered and exited the
retail chain in four years. Key to the ultimate downfall of the company,
however, was PE’s breaching of implicit contracts with key stakeholders —
its vendors, employees and the communities from which it drew its
customers.
To meet the high rent payments that were necessary to service the debt
used to purchase Mervyn’s, the PE owners needed to quickly increase cash
flow. They did so through immediate across-the-board cuts that disregarded
business needs. According to a former high-level manager at Mervyn’s head-
quarters (interview, 30 June 2011):
The finance directors were told they needed to cut 10–15% out of all budgets,
including employee payroll. . . . They didn’t want to understand what people did
— just decided they were overstaffed and needed to cut. . . . We were a profit center
— we were making money for the company; but they were more interested in
headcount.
While this manager remained with Mervyn’s until the end, she reported that
‘many finance directors left early on because they could see the writing on the
wall’ (interview, 30 June 2011).
The headcount cuts led to customer complaints about the lack of cleanli-
ness in the stores on customer satisfaction surveys. The outsourcing of ware-
house operations to a third-party management company led to further
complaints of poor service. The corporate VP explained (interview, 10 June
2011):
They did headcount reduction in the warehouse, and a lot of employees with many
years in those jobs lost their jobs. There were a lot of complaints about this from
the stores. Service went down with the new third party arrangement. Cost went
down as well — the company saved money. But the third party employees didn’t
have the same commitment that internal staff would have. . . . In terms of corpo-
rate strategy, all decisions were made for short-term gain. The PE investors had no
interest in the long-run future of the company.
Mervyn’s had a pay for performance system for supervisors and managers,
and bonuses depended on individual employee evaluations. The new
owners dramatically reduced her discretion to differentiate among employ-
ees and insisted on a series of payroll cuts when supervisors and managers
were working 15-h days. According to this high-level manager, ‘For me, I
put a lot into each employee review; they had no idea how capable my
employees were or how much effort and overtime they put in’ (interview, 30
June 2011).
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The new PE owners also slashed Mervyn’s community foundation fund of
$100,000 per year to $10,000. Mervyn’s mangers viewed these activities as
important for building customer support and loyalty in the communities in
which the chain’s stores were located. One high-level manager involved in the
effort noted that most stores had volunteer committees that decided how to
allocate funds for projects, which included tutoring and mentoring in local
schools, providing breakfasts for kids during summers and holidays, and
raising thousands of dollars for AIDS (interview, 30 June 2012).
It was the breach of trust with the department store’s vendors, however,
that led most directly to the chain’s bankruptcy. Trust plays a critical role in
the operations of a department store. Buyers place orders with manufacturers
for merchandise to be produced and delivered, but pay for the merchandise
only after they receive the goods. This may not be a problem for large
suppliers. But for many vendors, this process is facilitated by a financial
intermediary known as a ‘factor’ that advances funds to the manufacturer to
produce the goods and is repaid when the retailer pays for the merchandise.
In order to advance funds to the manufacturer, the factor must have confi-
dence that the retailer will pay for the goods that were ordered.
Mervyn’s relied extensively on CIT Group to guarantee its transactions
with vendors (Dodes and McCracken 2008; Thornton 2008) and had built
strong relationships with its vendors and CIT over five decades. Like many
retailers, Mervyn’s struggled to survive the downturn, and in 2007, it suffered
a $64 million loss (USBCDD 2008a) — less, it should be noted, than the $80
million annual increase in its rent payments following the leveraged buy-out.
The chain’s attempts to renegotiate store leases failed. In early 2008, CIT
grew concerned about Mervyn’s ability to pay for the merchandise it ordered
and turned to Sun Capital, the company’s main shareholder, for reassurance.
As Schleifer and Summers (1988) note, to ‘convince stakeholders that implicit
contracts are good, shareholders must be trusted not to breach contracts even
when it is value maximizing to do so’ (p. 38). Failing to get the reassurances
it sought, CIT started cutting back on its dealings with the department store
chain, raising fears among other vendors about Mervyn’s trustworthiness
and impairing the chain’s ability to contract with suppliers (Thornton 2008).
This left Mervyn’s without the merchandise it needed for the important
back-to-school selling season (Dodes and McCracken 2008).
Unable to maintain a flow of merchandise into the stores, the PE owners
took the company into bankruptcy in July 2008. The high rents, which the
chain’s landlords refused to lower, proved a stumbling block to the sale of the
company, and Mervyn’s was forced to close its remaining 177 stores, dismiss
its remaining 18,000 workers, and liquidate (USBCDD 2008a). Mervyn’s
told its managerial workforce that their pensions were now in the hands of
the bankruptcy court — a statement that was untrue as their pensions were in
a 401(k) savings plan. It took the efforts of a law firm to get the pension
accounts returned to the employees (interview with lawyer involved in reso-
lution of the case, 19 May 2011). Mervyn’s owed the Levi Strauss Company
more than $12 million, and taken together, owed all of its vendors in excess
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of $102 million — debt that was unsecured (USBCDD 2008b). The PE
owners, however, were little affected. Profits realized through the real estate
deals far exceeded losses on the retail side (Lattman 2008).
In September 2008, at the request of its vendors, Mervyn’s sued Target, the
PE firms and others involved in the transaction. The complaint alleged that
Target and the other defendants engaged in a fraudulent transaction by
knowingly causing Mervyn’s real estate to be transferred either with intent or
without adequate consideration of the effect on creditors. The complaint also
alleged thatMervyn’s owners breached their fiduciary duties toMervyn’s and
its creditors by various actions, including paying themselves a dividend at
a time when Mervyn’s, despite positive cash flow, was essentially insolvent
(USBCDD 2010). Target and the PE owners filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, but in March 2010, the Delaware bankruptcy court surprised
observers by allowing the case to proceed.
In October 2012, without admitting guilt, PE firms Cerberus Capital Man-
agement and Sun Capital Partners and real estate investment firm Lubert-
Adler/Klaff agreed to pay $166 million to Mervyn’s vendors and other
unsecured creditors. The settlement is one of the largest against PE compa-
nies accused of fraudulent conveyance (i.e. illegal asset stripping) and breach
of fiduciary duty.
EMI
In August 2007, Terra Firma, a UK-based PE fund headed by Guy Hands,
bought the music company EMI for £4.2 billion, supported by a £2.5 billion
loan from Citibank. EMI was a music company with a music publishing and
new music recording division. In an industry with declining CD sales, it was
in need of restructuring; and Hands planned cost cutting, including major
downsizing of managers and artists, as well as other strategies to turn the
company around. He eliminated waste, reduced management numbers by
one-third and significantly reduced the roster of retained recording artists.
Hands claimed that EMI wasted £70 million a year by subsidizing artists who
never produced saleable albums, overshot marketing budgets by £60 million
and wasted £25 million a year scrapping unsold CDs. His cost-saving strat-
egies significantly improved EMI’s cash flow under PE ownership. However,
Guy Hands was unable to turn EMI around in the manner that Terra Firma
had achieved with other portfolio firms.
Terra Firma faced financing problems associated with its repayment sched-
ule as well as with the timing of the deal. The debt burden was just too high
to secure the company as a going concern. Unlike many of Terra Firma’s
previous acquisitions, such as railway train leasing companies and motorway
service stations, it was more difficult to securitize EMI’s assets. Guy Hands
had pioneered securitization, but selling bonds backed by assets in a portfolio
company requires a stable cash flow. This approach failed at EMI because
the music recording division was losing money and overall cash flow was
weak, and it proved difficult to issue bonds against rights to publish songs.
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Failure to turn the company around, due in part to the global financial crisis
and the further decline in music sales, was further exacerbated by exchange
rates movements as the Citibank loan was dollar funded.
More fundamental to Hands’ failure to turn around EMI, however, was
his breach of trust with the established artists on whom the company
depended for developing an ongoing pipeline of new music. Because music
publishing and recording is fad oriented, its success depends on the availabil-
ity of a form of patient capital, wherein bankable established artists with
extensive mineable back catalogues subsidize new artists being developed
along an ‘artist pipeline’. To succeed, this established pattern of work orga-
nization and wider business model in the recording industry rests on the trust
of established artists in corporate management. Trust encourages such artists
to remain with the label, deliver saleable albums, and remain satisfied with
their own patterns of remuneration and agreed release schedules for recorded
music. Neither this loss leader approach to recording artists nor the associ-
ated implication of patient investment in new talent fits with the more
impatient PE approach to business and financial returns. Attempts by man-
agement to increase short-term returns for shareholders by pruning the roster
of established artists or reducing the pipeline of new talent can easily lead to
the voluntary departure of the company’s most valuable talent.
In fact, as Terra Firma improved cash flow and reduced costs, it alienated
its management as well as its top talent — its most valued assets. EMI’s
artists and repertoire managers viewed their discretion as the basis of longer-
term success in the industry. Terra Firma, by contrast, viewed this discretion
as opportunism and a source of waste to be eliminated. Rather than agree
to Terra Firma’s demands to alter EMI’s business model, many of the
company’s managers opted to exit instead.
As confidence in the owners’ decisions eroded, major artists such as The
Rolling Stones, Radiohead and Paul McCartney left EMI. Other big selling
artists threatened to do so and were slow to deliver albums: Coldplay, in
particular, only supplied their new album after EMI was seized by Citibank.
Kate Bush declined to produce a new full album and instead delivered a
‘director’s cut’ album with some new material, but mostly reworked old
material. Robbie Williams, a big seller in the UK and the EU with an £80
million EMI contract, also threatened to leave but did eventually deliver a
new album. However, he then rejoined his previous boy band, ‘Take That’,
who record for a different label. Subsequently, Williams declined to renew his
EMI contract and moved to Universal music, citing Hands’ ‘plantation
manager’ management style as one factor in his decision (Davoudi 2011). In
effect, these artists went on strike and worked to rule in the letter of their
contracts.
The buyout was a failure in part because Terra Firma applied an inappro-
priate business model. The PE business model appears less appropriate to
the creative sector where success rests on the implicit contract that massive
winners will subsidize less successful and early-stage artists. The across-
the-board cuts implemented to increase cash flow undermined this model.
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The departure of established artists and a dearth of new talent releasing
saleable albums resulted in an underdeveloped roster of artistic talent. EMI
relied increasingly on back catalogue— for example, greatest hits repackages
by artists such as Queen. At EMI, the breach of trust centred on Terra Firma
and Hands’ breakage of existing implicit contracts with recording artists,
artist and repertoire management, and line management more generally.
These contracts secured a strategy of diversifying risk by using highly suc-
cessful recording artists to cross-subsidize new and emerging artists — the
future revenue stream for the company — with full knowledge that some of
them would fail. The pursuit of short-term gains led to a failure to invest in
EMI’s future and to the alienation of stars who took their human capital
elsewhere.
In February 2011, Citibank seized EMI, when its holding companyMaltby
Holdings was declared insolvent (Edgecliffe-Johnson and Arnold 2010; Selb
2010). Prior to this point, Hands had manufactured the argument that he had
been misled by Citibank and threatened to sue them if they did not renego-
tiate Terra Firma’s loan repayments. However, Citibank was at that time
owned by the American tax payer, and the bank was loath to write off debt
in exchange for future equity. By calling Hands’ bluff, Citibank secured all
the equity capital of the now worthless EMI. At this point, Terra Firma owed
Citibank £3 billion, whereas EMI was worth only £1.8 billion — making it
worthless to Citibank’s PE arm. After a protracted court case in which Hands
accused Citibank of fraud, EMI is effectively worthless. All of Terra Firma’s
£1.5 billion, £70 million from Hands’ personal fortune and £220 million from
Terra Firma is now written off. The deal is recognized as one of the worst
examples of a public-to-private buyout ever, hitting limited partner investors
in Terra Firma, Citibank (EMI’s debt holder), EMI as a going concern
business, and management and established artists at the label.
The breach of trust in implicit contracts affected both professional employ-
ees and recording artists. Both employee groups have been downsized and
restructured, a process that undermined EMI’s new music division and left
the firm reliant on back catalogue and its library of songs. EMI recording
artists, employees and past employees in receipt of pension payments face an
uncertain future.
In autumn 2011, Citi commenced an EMI auction with suitors interested in
the whole firm or one of its two divisions. Citibank was initially unable to
offload EMI as potential buyers refused to take on board pension fund
commitments to EMI’s 22,000 pensioners; it only secured the sale of both
divisions by agreeing to maintain the pension fund itself. Citi maintained
what was in effect a ‘shell company’ on its balance sheet (but unlike Terra
Firma, whose strategy might have resulted in this), one where little return has
been secured for Citi investors. Misunderstanding the music business and
miscalculating how much value they could extract from the firm triggered
Terra Firma’s financial and operational failure, leading to a defection of
artist and management talent. EMI remains a going concern, but one where
revenues appear in terminal decline. Once both divisions have been divested,
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employee costs will remain a significant drain on cash flow as Citi cannot
offload final salary pension commitments to current and ex-employees. Ironi-
cally, other Terra Firma funds have recovered from the financial crisis, but
Terra Firma 3, the fund that financed the EMI fiasco, was in 2011 worth 40
per cent of its initial value. The group has downsized its investment profes-
sionals by 50 per cent to 60 in large measure because of the EMI failure.
Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper Village
The case of the Manhattan apartment complexes, Stuyvesant Town/Peter
Cooper Village, demonstrates how breach of trust affects working people in
a different way: as tenants in rent-regulated apartments. In cities such as New
York, rent-controlled apartments have been a source of affordable housing
for middle- and working-class communities. These stable neighbourhoods
enable ordinary New Yorkers to live within the city’s boundaries and con-
tribute to the vibrancy of city life. Communities view this hard-to-replace
housing as an asset and tenant turnover is low. The city gives landlords
certain tax breaks to support this strategy.
While rent-regulated apartments had not traditionally attracted much
attention from Wall Street, this changed in the frothy days of the real estate
bubble. Between 2006 and 2009, PE-backed funds purchased 100,000 units
(about 10 per cent of the total stock) of affordable, rent-regulated housing in
New York City (ANDH 2009). In 2006, a joint PE venture sponsored by
Tishman Speyer and BlackRock purchased the landmark complexes, Stuyve-
sant Town/Peter Cooper Village, from Metropolitan Life. The 80-acre prop-
erty on Manhattan’s East Side included 11,227 apartments housing 25,000
residents.
Rent-stabilized apartment buildings typically yield a return of 7 or 8
per cent a year, taken as profit by owners rather than as capital gains. The
city allows only modest rent increases for existing tenants and more substan-
tial raises on vacant apartments, especially if the owner has upgraded or
renovated the apartment (ANDH 2008, 2009). The PE investors saw an
opportunity for high returns by breaching the decades-long contract between
landlord and tenant that allowed the tenant to renew the lease each year with
only a modest rent increase. Through deliberate measures to increase tenant
turnover, the new PE owners expected to capture a high percentage of the
building’s apartments over a five-year period and bring those rents up closer
to market rates. While some new value would be created by upgrading or
renovating vacant apartments, by far the largest part of the increase in
shareholder value would come from a transfer of wealth from renters to
owners.
The buyers justified the record-breaking purchase price of $5.4 billion on
the grounds that they expected to triple net operating income for the building
in five years (ANDH 2008, 2009; Bagli 2010a,b). The property was appraised
‘as is’ at $5.4 billion — a very high gross rent multiple of 22, and ‘as
stabilized’ at $6.9 billion. This served as the basis for the multi-billion dollar
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mortgage loan. The new owners raised total equity financing of $1.9 billion
(with just $112.5 million each contributed by Tishman Speyer and Black-
Rock) and borrowed the rest to finance the purchase and meet mortgage
payments in the short term (ANDH 2008: 10).
The assumptions and business model behind the Tishman Speyer/
BlackRock deal were typical of many PE-backed buyouts of rent-regulated
housing. The new PE owners expected to increase the net operating income of
$112.3 million at the time of purchase in 2006 to an underwritten net oper-
ating income of $333.9 million in 2011, virtually tripling it in five years. At the
time of purchase, the average rent per unit was $1,707 and the average debt
service (mortgage and mezzanine loans) was $2,160. The total interest-only
debt payments exceeded the rental income. The owners anticipated that 3,000
apartments would become vacant over this period, above the historic turn-
over rate for this complex, and could be deregulated. The new owners
planned to raise rents on deregulated apartments by 15–30 per cent to bring
them up to market prices (ANDH 2008: 6, 10).
To succeed, the new owners needed to achieve high rates of turnover; but
many long-time tenants, although forced to pay higher rents, refused to
leave. The PE partners were unable to convert enough apartments to market
rents to be able to service the $3 billion mortgage; and in January 2010,
unable to make the $16.1 million monthly mortgage payment, they defaulted
(Bagli 2010b). Tishman Speyer and BlackRock lost their initial investments
of $112.5 million each, offset somewhat by the $18 million a year in manage-
ment fees they collected. The losses were far larger for the limited partners
who provided the bulk of the equity investment — the Church of England,
the government of Singapore, and three public employee pension funds in
California and Florida that lost a total of $850 million. The higher rents
imposed on tenants turned out to be illegal, and residents were owed $200
million in overpayments at the time of bankruptcy. Because each deal made
by a PE fund is structured as a special purpose entity, Tishman Speyer had no
responsibility to make up the losses or reimburse the tenants despite the fact
that it held a $33.5 billion portfolio of projects on four continents and $2
billion in cash at the time of the default. Failure of the Manhattan project
hardly made a dent in the company’s 10-year average annual returns (Bagli
2010a,b; Carmiel 2010).
CW Capital took control of the properties on behalf of the multitude of
investors in the commercial mortgage-backed securities backed by the apart-
ment complexes that hold the $3 billion mortgage. As rent-controlled prop-
erties, Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper Village have a market value of about
$1.9 billion, far too little to pay off the mortgage holders. On their behalf,
CW Capital was negotiating with the tenants’ association which, in Novem-
ber 2011, formed a partnership with Toronto-based Brookfield Asset Man-
agement to buy the properties. If successful, Brookfield and the association
will offer tenants the option of buying their units or remaining as tenants in
their rent-controlled apartments. There is a real danger that the city will lose
this large block of affordable, middle-class housing (Bagli 2011; Levitt 2011).
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Cadbury Schweppes (CS) and Kraft Foods
Cadbury in the UK provides another example of breach of trust — in this
case of a 150-year commitment to the community of Bourneville, just south
of Birmingham England, where the Cadbury family built a chocolate empire
based on a ‘model factory town’ designed to support the health and well-
being of its working families. Prior to acquisition, Kraft stated publicly that
it would keep all Cadbury plants open, including one in Bristol earmarked
for closure; but subsequently it reneged on these commitments and laid off
one-third of its 5,500 UK workforce. This case differs from the others,
however, in the complicity of the Cadbury managers in their breach of trust.
They sought no guarantees from Kraft about promises it made to workers,
suppliers or the community, citing instead their legal duty to protect share-
holder interests.
Quakers George and Richard Cadbury established Bourneville in 1861,
and although work at its plants was Taylorized, the firm was committed to
trade union recognition and worker participation. ‘Cadburyism’ came to
denote consensus decision making based on labour management consulta-
tion. In addition, it provided a benchmark against which to judge changes to
company finances, work organization and industrial relations. After a public
listing in 1962, Cadbury merged with Schweppes in 1969 and continued to
support jobs in Birmingham and to maintain a commitment to the Cadbury
model. The Cadbury brand was built on its high quality and British identity
and, during the 1980s, the core businesses of the firm were secured by a
sustained investment programme financed out of retained profits and succes-
sive rights issues (Smith et al. 1990). This commitment, however, began to
unravel in the mid-2000s when new investors came in, resulting in the sale of
Cadbury to the American-owned Kraft Corporation in conjunction with the
PE arm of RBS.
In 2007, Nelson Peltz, a billionaire American activist investor, acquired 3
per cent of CS. Peltz saw CS as a bundle of assets, which, if divided, could
unlock considerable shareholder value. Cadbury was to remain a publicly
listed firm, whereas Schweppes would be sold to PE buyers; but the proposed
sale of Schweppes to PE buyers fell through (Wiggins and Hume 2007).
Nonetheless, in January 2008, CS went ahead with the de-merger, providing
immediate short-term returns to Cadbury’s shareholders. Despite divesting
Schweppes, Cadbury remained the world’s largest confectionary firm.
The break-up of the company set the stage for a leveraged buyout of
Cadbury by Kraft Foods (Cadbury 2010a). The British public, trade unions
andmembers of the then Labour government were fiercely opposed to the bid
because Kraft had previously acquired the UK chocolate manufacturer
Terry’s and moved production to Poland. Nonetheless, after a protracted
bidding process, Kraft secured Cadbury in January 2010 at a total price of
£12 billion, with £7 billion of the purchase price secured by a loan from RBS
PE. This debt burden, similar in size to a PE leveraged buyout, put Kraft’s
global operations on the defensive. By January 2010, hedge funds owned 30
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per cent of the shares. This share ownership structure raised serious doubts
about the commitment of the firm’s shareholders to other stakeholders —
workers, their communities, and fair-trade interests in the UK and down
Cadbury’s supply chain (Cadbury 2010b).
In the Kraft acquisition, Cadbury effectively became a Kraft/RBS portfo-
lio firm: Kraft borrowed 58 per cent of the acquisition price from RBS PE,
and Cadbury assets are now collateralized on the RBS balance sheet. While
Kraft is unlikely to seek an early exit from Cadbury, there is evidence that —
despite assurances to the British public and to the firm’s workforce to the
contrary — specific Cadbury brands may be spun off to meet the perfor-
mance demands of Kraft’s loan agreements (Lucas 2011). Cadbury was
already a successful multinational firm before its acquisition, so it is unclear
where Kraft can make operational improvements to increase cash flow and
service its new debts.
Cadbury’s suppliers have also experienced breach of trust, as illustrated
by Burton’s Biscuits. In 2007, Burton’s secured £4 milllion of state support
to remain open, underpinned by a flexible collective bargaining agreement
that traded job security for work flexibility and the promise of guaranteed
Cadbury work until at least May 2012; but that promise fell through. In
January 2011, Burton’s (also owned by PE) announced its intention to
close its Merseyside plant with the loss of 350 jobs despite its professed
efficiency. Burton’s PE owners had already extracted value from the plant
in the form of £13 million of cost reductions — returned to investors and
used for massive increases in director remuneration (Guardian Newspaper
2011; IUF 2011).
In the short term, the real winners were the PE and hedge funds; the real
losers are Cadbury workers and their communities. While Kraft stated pub-
licly, as part of its acquisition campaign, that it would keep all Cadbury
plants open — including one in Bristol that was earmarked for closure — it
subsequently reneged on this commitment. The UK takeover panel found
that in large measure, Kraft had not accurately communicated information
to ‘target’ shareholders (i.e. those who were committed to Cadbury’s as a
firm), workers and local managers (Tsagas 2012). Moreover, while Kraft had
a two-year deal with trade unions to forego redundancy and plant closures,
it announced plans to lay off one-third of its UK workforce of 5,500 employ-
ees commencing in March 2012. That is the shortest possible consultation
period for redundancy under UK law after the two-year deal expires.
In addition, Kraft consolidated the Cadbury headquarters into its own
European headquarters in Zurich, leaving the question of Cadbury’s domi-
cile and country of origin uncertain. Cadbury will become one division in
‘Mondelez’, Kraft’s global snacks business. Bourneville, the former Cadbury
headquarters, will be demoted to Kraft’s centre of excellence for chocolate.
The global snacks division has a non-executive director from a prominent
PE firm who is expected to advise the new division on operational, manage-
ment, acquisition, and divestment strategies and its possible future initial
public offering. Cadbury’s commitments to stakeholders — including the
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Bourneville community, trade unions, the UK Parliament and Cadbury
suppliers — that Cadbury would remain a UK-based enterprise from top to
bottom have already been broken.
4. Challenges to employment relations research
The cases in this article challenge the argument that PE actors return over-
sized returns to shareholders through value creation strategies alone. Rather,
at least an important part of shareholder gains come from the losses that
existing stakeholders experience in the form of lower returns to relationship-
specific investments. The short-term focus on shareholder maximization pro-
vides large incentives for PE firms to renege on the implicit contracts that are
critical for the company’s ongoing ability to contract with stakeholders it
needs to stay in business. The leveraged debt model of disciplining workers is
at odds with business models that drive competitiveness through knowledge-
based assets and innovations. Research has demonstrated the importance of
trust-based relations to sustain competitive advantage, the centrality of trust
in supplier relations in lean production networks and the importance of
trust to the successful implementation of performance-enhancing practices.
Breach of trust in organizations may facilitate financial restructuring, but it
undermines long-term investments to improve cost, quality and innovation.
Long-run competitiveness of individual portfolio companies takes a back
seat to maximizing financial returns of the total portfolio over the fund’s
10-year lifespan.
Our institutional analysis of PE mechanisms of value redistribution also
provides an example of how employment relations scholars can move beyond
labour process analysis to examine awider range of sources of value extraction
and to investigate a broader range of stakeholders and the intersection of
outcomes for workers and other players. AtMervyn’s, Sun Capital’s financial
decision to divide Mervyn’s into an operations and a property company,
as well as its dividend recapitalization, set in motion a series of events
that destabilized the company. It imposed across-the-board layoffs without
regard to business needs, cut grants to communities that were loyal customers
and later refused to provide payment guarantees to vendors, undermining
long-standing relations of trust that led to its final demise and the layoff of
thousands of workers. At Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper Village, the highly
leveraged financial deal itself put in jeopardy the real and implicit contracts of
renters and creditors. At EMI, Terra Firma made financial decisions that
broke with the industry’s established business model and abrogated the
implicit contracts with top media stars on which the company depended for
long-term survival. And the fate of industrial communities such as Bourneville
rests in the hands ofmultinational corporations, coupledwith global investors
such as PE and hedge funds, which are focused only on shareholder value.
If the assumptions of managerial capitalism no longer hold and it is
necessary to move beyond the frame of traditional labour–management
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relations, then our analysis provides a platform for re-examining the frame-
work of nationally regulated business systems found in the VoC literature.
While national business systems research assumes that strategic decisions are
made among key stakeholders inside the firm, often through contestation or
consultation, the cases in this article suggest that key decisions are made by
the new owners, often prior to contact with key stakeholders. By prioritizing
shareholder value at the expense of other stakeholders, PE owners reduce
managerial opportunities to engage other stakeholders in long-term strate-
gies to enhance innovation and sustainable growth. Sometimes top managers
of portfolio companies may embrace PE strategies in exchange for sharing in
the gains (as in the Cadbury case), but in our other cases, they were margin-
alized or fired, with hand-picked new managers and a board of directors
brought in by the PE firm. The relationship of PE owners to portfolio
company managers is an important topic for future research.
PE’s operations across borders also mean that the core assumption that
firm behaviour depends on sets of interlocking institutional arrangements
within national economies warrants re-examination. The VoC literature has
focused on the various roles that markets, hierarchies and networks play in
co-ordinating economic activity and how different institutional constella-
tions induce distinct corporate strategies and comparative advantages (Hall
and Soskice 2001: 1–72). However, it pays little attention to processes of
capital accumulation or to differences between distinct fractions of capital.
It considers financial capital mainly in relation to firms’ access to finance —
as in the differences between bank- and equity-marketing financing in
co-ordinated and liberal market economies.
Our cases suggest that the new financial intermediaries are not particularly
embedded in, or constrained by, national business systems. Financialization
has the potential to uncouple business system drivers from the complex
interlock of traditional institutional complementarities, as the cases of
Cadbury and EMI suggest. Within the framework of managerial capitalism
and country of origin, both firms may still be presented as UK based if
not UK owned. But EMI is securitized on CitiBank’s balance sheet while
Cadbury is a subsidiary of Kraft’s European snacks division. Research needs
to address the movement towards a more rootless financial capitalism that
focuses on the interests of international investors rather than on stakeholders
in portfolio firms. Both cases demonstrate how the contemporary dominance
of conglomerate brands and financial markets’ appetite for immediate profits
take precedence over cultural and institutional features of business and work
organization allegedly embedded in divergent national business systems.
To sum up: the challenges facing workers and employment relations
research identified in this article lead us to equally challenging conclusions.
First, firms governed by agents of financial capitalism feel free to breach
bargains previously established with incumbent stakeholders. The use of
assets in portfolio firms as security not only exposes portfolio firm assets (and
in turn employees and former employees) to risk in leveraged buyouts but
allows new owners to break implicit contracts to meet debt obligations,
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exacerbating the divergence of interests among owners, middle managers,
workers, suppliers and local communities. Second, there is the question of
who makes the key decisions for portfolio firms and how, and whether trade
unions or other stakeholders in portfolio firms have even the opportunity to
consult or negotiate with owners over decisions that affect explicit and
implicit contracts. Here, new comparative research could examine breach of
trust across different national regimes and how institutions may configure
stakeholder relations that limit breach of trust or make implicit contracts
more explicit and legally binding. Third, value and the realization of value
under PE mean that the nationality of investors and shareholders becomes a
less significant factor and challenges researchers to re-examine key institu-
tional and cultural research tools.
Final version accepted on 28 October 2012.
Note
1. An earlier version of this article was presented at the BJIR 50th Anniversary
conference in December 2011 at the London School of Economics. The authors
would like to thank the anonymous referees and Paul Edwards for constructive
criticism on a previous version of the paper. Office management and finance
management at the University of Birmingham was provided by Jane Whitmarsh
and Jacqui Ward.
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